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THREATS AGAINST AMERICA:  
THE SECOND CIRCUIT AS ARBITER 
OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 
David Raskin* 
INTRODUCTION 
For nearly 100 years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
has been a leading force in defining and resolving the uniquely thorny 
issues that arise at the intersection of individual liberty and national 
security.  The court’s decisions in this arena are characterized by its 
willingness to tackle difficult questions and its skill in balancing the needs 
of the government with the rights of the accused to ensure fundamental 
fairness in the ages of espionage and terror. 
I.  THE ESPIONAGE PROBLEM  
AND THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR STATE 
In 1917, soon after the United States entered World War I, Congress 
passed the Espionage Act.1  The new law strengthened existing prohibitions 
on actions harmful to the national defense and, most notably, authorized the 
death penalty for anyone convicted of sharing information with the intent to 
harm U.S. military efforts or to aid the nation’s enemies.2 
 
*  The author, an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Western District of Missouri, wrote this 
Article when he was a partner in the international law firm Clifford Chance.  From 1999 to 
2011, he was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York, 
where he served as a chief of that office’s terrorism and national security unit.  Among the 
numerous international terrorism investigations and prosecutions he participated in or 
supervised are several of the cases discussed in this Article, including the prosecutions of 
Zacarias Moussaoui for the plot resulting in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa.  
Additionally, Mr. Raskin argued the appeal of three of Ghailani’s codefendants before the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  Mr. Raskin is a Lecturer-in-Law at Columbia 
Law School and an Adjunct Professor at New York Law School.  He is a graduate of Ithaca 
College (1986) and New York Law School (1994) and formerly a Law Clerk to the 
Honorable Leonard D. Wexler, U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of New York.  The 
author recognizes Sarah Sulkowski, Andrew Nelson, and Bucky Knight, associates at 
Clifford Chance, for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this Article.  The views 
and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Department of Justice. 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–
799 (2012)). 
 2. See 18 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
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The New York office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
quickly emerged as the hub of the federal counterintelligence effort, 
investigating and pursuing both foreign and domestic threats to the war 
effort.  The resulting prosecutions defined the era and remain household 
names today:  the Duquesne Spy Ring, the Rosenbergs, Alger Hiss, 
Rudolph Abel, and more, which are discussed below. 
A.  The Espionage Cases 
In each of these cases, the Second Circuit shaped the nation’s evolving 
understanding of the rule of law during an era of ever-increasing threats to 
national security. 
1.  United States v. Heine 
Edmund Carl Heine was a German immigrant who came to the United 
States in 1914 and became an American citizen in 1920.3  An auto mechanic 
by trade, he rose to become a factory manager and superintendent, working 
for the Ford Motor Company throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, and 
then for the Chrysler Corporation in the late 1930s.4  During this period, 
Heine was recruited by Volkswagenwerk,5 at that time a fledgling 
automobile company controlled by Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich, to join a 
German espionage network that came to be known as the Duquesne Spy 
Ring.6  Heine’s task was to obtain information concerning the American 
aviation and automotive industries to assist in the Third Reich’s 
preparations for war against the United States.7  For several years, Heine 
passed along what information he could glean from publicly available 
sources, such as magazines, newspapers, catalogues, and correspondence 
with manufacturers.8 
In 1940, the FBI penetrated the Duquesne Spy Ring with the help of a 
double agent named William Sebold—another naturalized American citizen 
of German origin who was coerced into joining the network during a return 
visit to Germany in 1939.9  Unwilling to spy against the United States, 
Sebold notified the American consulate of his recruitment and agreed to 
help the FBI infiltrate the ring.10  For the next sixteen months, the FBI used 
Sebold to identify German spies on American soil and to transmit 
misinformation to the German regime.11 
 
 3. See United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 814 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. at 815; see also The 33 Members of the Duquesne Spy Ring, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/the-duquesne-spy-ring/ 
33-members (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [perma.cc/Y7JL-GWXT]. 
 7. See Heine, 151 F.2d at 814. 
 8. See id. at 815. 
 9. See The 33 Members of the Duquesne Spy Ring, supra note 6. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. 
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On December 13, 1941, all thirty-three members of the Duquesne Spy 
Ring were convicted under the Espionage Act and sentenced to a total of 
more than 300 years in prison.12  Heine was convicted of violating the Act’s 
prohibition on transmitting information “intended to be used ‘to the injury 
of the United States’ [or] ‘to the advantage of a foreign nation.’”13  He 
appealed his conviction to the Second Circuit. 
In a 1945 opinion, authored by the legal giant Judge Learned Hand, the 
court reversed Heine’s Espionage Act conviction, holding that the Act’s 
prohibitions could properly apply only to secrets closely guarded by the 
government.14  In language that foreshadows current debates about bulk 
data collection in the service of counterterrorism, the court pointed out that 
in wartime, any information may be relevant to the national defense: 
It seems plain that the [Espionage Act] cannot cover information about all 
those activities which become tributary to the “national defense” in time 
of war; for in modern war there are none which do not.  The amount of 
iron smelted, of steel forged, of parts fabricated; the number of arable 
acres, their average yield; engineering schools, scientific schools, medical 
schools, their staffs, their students, their curriculums, their laboratories; 
metal deposits; technical publications of all kinds; such nontechnical 
publications as disclose the pacific or belligerent temper of the people, or 
their discontent with the government:  every part in short of the national 
economy and everything tending to disclose the national mind are 
important in time of war, and will then “relate to the national defense.”15 
The court thus reasoned that construing the statute as forbidding the sharing 
of publicly available information would improperly impute to Congress “an 
assertion of national isolationism.”16  Instead, the Second Circuit read the 
statute to permit the transmission of information that the armed services 
have not sought to keep secret: 
likeservices must be trusted to determine what information may be 
broadcast without prejudice to the “national defense,” and their consent to 
its dissemination is as much evidenced by what they do not seek to 
suppress, as by what they utter.  Certainly it cannot be unlawful to spread 
such information within the United States; and, if so, it would be to the 
last degree fatuous to forbid its transmission to the citizens of a friendly 
foreign power.  “Information relating to the national defense,” whatever 
else it means, cannot therefore include that kind of information, and so far 
as Heine’s reports contained it, they were not within the [Espionage Act’s 
purview].17 
 
 12. See id. 
 13. Heine, 151 F.2d at 815 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 32 (1944)).  Heine also was convicted 
of violating 22 U.S.C. § 233, which makes it a crime for an agent of a foreign government to 
fail to register as such with the Secretary of State. See Heine, 151 F.2d. at 814. 
 14. See Heine, 151 F.2d. at 817. 
 15. Id. at 815. 
 16. Id. at 816. 
 17. Id. 
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The court noted that this reading was consistent with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s prior statement in Gorin v. United States,18 to the effect that, where 
a report “relating to national defense” is published by the military or by 
Congress, “there can, of course, in all likelihood be no reasonable intent to 
give an advantage to a foreign government.”19 
The Heine decision sent a strong and unmistakable message to the law 
enforcement community, one that the court would have occasion to repeat 
in the coming years:  even in wartime, and even under the most 
unsympathetic circumstances, the Second Circuit would not bend the law to 
elevate prosecutorial interests over the rights of individual defendants.  
Other circuit courts have relied on and followed Heine in delineating the 
government’s power to prosecute alleged spies for transmitting publicly 
available information.20  The Heine opinion was also cited, more than thirty 
years after it was issued, by one of the architects of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 197821 (FISA), Christopher H. Pyle, in his testimony to 
Congress: 
I agree with the courts; future Heines ought to be free of electronic 
surveillance until they conspire to steal classified information.  The 
ACLU argues for an impermissibly indeterminate criminal law; the 
Justice Department assumes, as Judge Learned Hand put it so well in the 
Heine case, “that there are some kinds of information ‘relating to the 
national defense’ which must not be given to a friendly power, not even 
an ally, no matter how innocent, or even commendable the purpose of the 
sender may be.”  Writing for a unanimous panel Judge Hand added with 
characteristic understatement, “Obviously, so drastic a repression of the 
free exchange of information it is wise carefully to scrutinize, lest 
extravagant and absurd consequences result.”22 
Thus, Heine can fairly be said to have helped shape the system of judicial 
review that governs American counterintelligence efforts to this day. 
2.  United States v. Coplon 
Five years after the Heine appeal, the Second Circuit was again called 
upon to balance the constitutional rights of a defendant against the 
government’s interest in prosecuting a suspected spy.  This time, the alleged 
mole was a Justice Department analyst named Judith Coplon, who was 
 
 18. 312 U.S. 19 (1941). 
 19. Heine, 151 F.2d at 817 (quoting Gorin, 312 U.S. at 28). 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 576–77 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming espionage conviction over defendant’s objection to the definition of “publicly 
available information,” and explaining that “under Gorin and Heine, the central issue is the 
secrecy of the information, which is determined by the government’s actions”). 
 21. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885 
(2012)). 
 22. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Intelligence & the Rights of Ams. of the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 94 
(1978) (statement of Christopher H. Pyle, Professor, Mt. Holyoke College) (quoting Heine, 
151 F.2d at 815). 
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suspected of funneling information to the Soviets.23  In 1949, the FBI 
placed wiretaps on Coplon’s home and office telephones and subsequently 
arrested her, without a warrant, during a rendezvous with a suspected KGB 
agent.24  At the time of her arrest, Coplon was carrying incriminating 
documents that she apparently intended to hand over to the Soviets.25  She 
was convicted on several counts, including attempt to deliver national 
defense information and conspiracy to defraud the United States.26 
The Second Circuit, in another opinion authored by Judge Hand, reversed 
the convictions on two grounds.  Principally, the court found that the 
convictions were impermissibly based on the “fruit of the poisonous 
tree”27—namely, evidence derived from illegal wiretaps and a warrantless 
arrest, all of which violated Coplon’s Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.28  The decision added teeth to the 
evolving legal principle known as the “exclusionary rule,” then only a few 
decades old, which forbade the use of evidence gathered in violation of the 
U.S. Constitution.29  In its decision, the Second Circuit emphasized that 
exclusion of the fruits of illegal searches and arrests “is the only tolerable 
result” where, as in Coplon’s case, “the head of the same department of a 
government which has charge of the prosecution has directed the unlawful 
acquisition of the information.”30 
The harshness of the reversal was not lost on the court.  Judge Hand 
opined that “perhaps the doctrine should be modified” insofar as it imputes 
the wrongdoing of all government agencies and employees to any 
prosecutor who seeks to use the fruits of their activities.31  He suggested 
that “perhaps it would be desirable to set limits—as, for example, in cases 
of espionage, sabotage, kidnapping, extortion and in general investigations 
involving national security and defen[s]e—to the immunity from 
‘wiretapping’ of those who are shown by independent evidence to be 
probably engaged in crime.”32  But, in the end, the court conceded that it 
had “no power to deal” with such matters but was, instead, bound to “take 
the law as we find it.”33  The comments foreshadowed future decisions of 
the Supreme Court that carved significant exceptions into the exclusionary 
rule.34 
 
 23. See United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 631–32 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. at 632. 
 26. See id. at 631. 
 27. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). 
 28. See id.; see also Coplon, 185 F.2d at 640. 
 29. At the time, the exclusionary rule was only applied in the federal courts; it would not 
become mandatory in state tribunals until the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 30. Coplon, 185 F.2d at 640. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. For example, in 1963, the Supreme Court revitalized the notion that the “taint” 
associated with illegally obtained evidence, and the need to exclude it, could dissipate over 
time. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963).  In 1984, the Supreme 
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The court’s second concern with Coplon’s convictions related to the 
government’s invocation of the “state secrets” privilege as a basis to litigate 
the legitimacy of the wiretaps before the court, ex parte, without disclosing 
the underlying materials to Coplon.35  Without dismissing the sensitive 
nature of the information before the court, or any other information that, if 
divulged, could “imperil” national security, the court held that the 
government may not simultaneously withhold such evidence from a 
defendant and use the evidence against that defendant.36  According to the 
court, the defendant’s right to mount an effective defense would not take a 
backseat to even the most potent of national security claims.  If the material 
would be helpful to the defense, the government would have to either 
disclose the material or abandon the prosecution.37  The concept, embraced 
several years later by the Supreme Court in Roviaro v. United States,38 is 
now fundamental to all cases in which the government seeks to avoid the 
disclosure of sensitive information, whether it is the identity of a police 
informant or highly classified sources and methods of gathering foreign 
intelligence.39 
After the reversal of her conviction, Judith Coplon was never retried:  
evidentiary issues arising from the suppression ruling made another 
criminal trial nearly impossible, and the indictment against her was dropped 
two decades later.40  She married her lawyer, Albert Socolov, they raised 
four children together, and in 2011, Coplon died at age eighty-nine.41 
3.  United States v. Hiss 
Two days after striking down Coplon’s conviction, the Second Circuit 
issued its famous decision in United States v. Hiss.42 
Alger Hiss was the former Director of the State Department’s Office of 
Special Political Affairs, Secretary General of the 1945 United Nations 
Charter Conference, and had attended the 1945 Yalta Conference with then-
President Franklin D. Roosevelt.43  In 1948, a magazine editor named 
 
Court created the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, which permitted 
the use of information derived from “tainted” evidence upon a showing that it eventually 
would have been found through legitimate channels. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 450 
(1984).  In 1988, the Supreme Court added the “independent source doctrine,” which 
validated the use of “tainted” evidence when it could be shown that it was acquired by a 
second source, independent of the offending conduct. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 
533, 537–38 (1988). 
 35. See Coplon, 185 F.2d at 637–38. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 638. 
 38. 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
 39. See id. at 60–61 & n.10. 
 40. See Sam Roberts, Judith Coplon, Haunted by Espionage Case, Dies at 89, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/us/02coplon.html [perma.cc/ 
5RYE-WAKG]. 
 41. See id. 
 42. 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 43. See The Alger Hiss Case, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no5/html/v44i5a01p.htm (last visited Sept. 
6, 2016) [perma.cc/E6QD-VUHY]. 
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Whittaker Chambers testified before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) that both he and Hiss had 
been members of the Communist Party since the mid-1930s and had 
participated in a Communist group whose goal was the infiltration of the 
U.S. government.44 
Upon learning of this accusation, Hiss demanded an opportunity to give 
his own testimony before HUAC, where he denied under oath that he had 
ever been a Communist Party member or sympathizer, or that he knew 
anyone named Whittaker Chambers.45  When, during his testimony, Hiss 
was shown a photograph of Chambers, he stated that he did not recognize 
the man pictured and demanded the opportunity to confront his accuser.46  
Several weeks later, a freshman Congressman named Richard M. Nixon 
arranged for both Chambers and Hiss to appear before HUAC 
simultaneously, at which time Hiss acknowledged that he had known 
Chambers (albeit under the name George Crosley) and, indeed, had sublet 
an apartment to Chambers and lent him a car.47  Hiss continued, however, to 
deny Chambers’ allegations, and he challenged Chambers to repeat them 
outside the privileged forum of the committee hearing, where Chambers 
was immune from libel charges.48 
Chambers accepted Hiss’s challenge by repeating the allegations during a 
subsequent appearance on the then-radio show “Meet the Press,” and Hiss 
responded by filing a libel suit in federal court.49  In the course of discovery 
in that action, Chambers testified for the first time that Hiss was not only a 
Communist but also a Soviet spy, and Chambers produced various 
documents corroborating the claim.50  HUAC then issued a subpoena to 
Chambers demanding that he turn over any other such materials, and 
Chambers complied by surrendering several rolls of microfilm that he had 
hidden in a hollowed out pumpkin on his Maryland farm, containing images 
of confidential State Department documents that, along with the previously 
produced materials, became known as the “Pumpkin Papers.”51 
Although the ten-year statute of limitations period for an espionage 
charge had expired, both Chambers and Hiss were called before a federal 
grand jury in New York City where Chambers repeated his allegations and 
Hiss repeated his denials.52  Hiss was then indicted and, after his first trial 
ended in a hung jury, was eventually convicted at a second trial on two 
counts of perjury.53 
Hiss appealed to the Second Circuit on the ground that there was 
insufficient evidence to support his convictions, citing the rule that a perjury 
 
 44. See Hiss, 185 F.2d at 824. 
 45. See id. at 824–25. 
 46. See id. at 825. 
 47. See id. at 825–26. 
 48. See id. at 828. 
 49. See id.; see also The Alger Hiss Case, supra note 43. 
 50. See Hiss, 185 F.2d at 828. 
 51. See id.; see also The Alger Hiss Case, supra note 43. 
 52. See Hiss, 185 F.2d at 828. 
 53. See id. at 828–29. 
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conviction cannot be based solely on one witness’s uncorroborated 
testimony.54  The panel of Judges Harrie Chase, Thomas Swan, and 
Augustus Hand unanimously affirmed Hiss’s conviction, holding that the 
documentary evidence provided by Chambers was sufficient to corroborate 
Chambers’s testimony that Hiss had been a Communist and a Soviet 
agent.55  The Supreme Court subsequently declined to review the 
decision.56 
Hiss ultimately served three years and eight months of his five-year 
prison term and was released in 1954.  Three years later, he published a 
book in which he detailed the flaws in the prosecution’s case against him.57  
In 1975, Hiss was readmitted to the Massachusetts Bar, which had disbarred 
him at the time of his conviction.58  He later published an autobiography in 
which he once again challenged his perjury conviction.59  Hiss continued to 
maintain his innocence until his death in 1996.60 
The Hiss case is notable not only for the prosecution’s use of perjury 
charges to overcome the statute of limitations problem—which became a 
tool for the pursuit of retired spies throughout the Cold War61—but also for 
the Second Circuit’s dispassionate application of the law, notwithstanding 
the strong political forces at work on both sides of the case.  The case is 
also noteworthy for the central role Richard Nixon played in procuring 
Hiss’s original committee testimony and the grand jury transcripts (which 
were unsealed by court order in 1999) showing that Nixon was influential 
in obtaining the perjury indictment.62  Additionally, the pro-Hiss camp 
included prominent figures of its own:  two Supreme Court justices, Felix 
Frankfurter and Stanley Reed, testified as character witnesses for Hiss at his 
first trial,63 and then-President Harry S. Truman publicly characterized the 
Hiss prosecution as a “red herring.”64 
Given the intensity of opinions on both sides of the case, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that controversy over Hiss’s guilt has persisted long after his 
conviction.  World War II-era Soviet cables, decrypted during the 
government’s “Venona Project” in the 1940s and publicly released by the 
 
 54. See id. at 824. 
 55. See id. at 824, 833. 
 56. See Hiss v. United States, 340 U.S. 948 (1951). 
 57. See ALGER HISS, IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION (1957). 
 58. See Daniel Q. Haney, Alger Hiss Is Readmitted to Mass. Bar, GETTYSBURG TIMES, 
Aug. 8, 1975, at 13. 
 59. See ALGER HISS, RECOLLECTIONS OF A LIFE (1988). 
 60. See Janny Scott, Alger Hiss, Divisive Icon of the Cold War, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 16, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/16/nyregion/alger-hiss-divisive-icon-of-
the-cold-war-dies-at-92.html?pagewanted=all [perma.cc/9CJT-GNMH]. 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 62. See The Alger Hiss Case, supra note 43. 
 63. See Willard Edwards, 2 Justices Testify in Hiss’ Defense, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 23, 
1949, at 1. 
 64. See Walter Trohan, Record Shows Truman Used “Red Herring,” CHI. DAILY TRIB., 
Jan. 9, 1954, at pt. 1–5. 
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Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency in 1995, appear 
to bolster the case against Hiss.65 
4.  United States v. Zborowski 
In 1959, the Second Circuit heard another challenge to a perjury 
conviction of an accused Soviet spy.66  Mark Zborowski was an 
anthropologist and an admitted former covert operative for the Soviet 
national police force, the NKVD, who had infiltrated the Trotskyite 
organization in Paris in the 1930s and may have been involved in the 
assassinations of various members of that organization, including Leon 
Trotsky’s son, Lev Sedov.67  Zborowski claimed, however, that he had not 
worked for the NKVD since immigrating to the United States in 1941, 
contradicting statements by a man named Jack Soble, who claimed to have 
operated as Zborowski’s Soviet handler in New York during the 1940s.68 
Called to testify before a grand jury in 1957, Zborowski specifically 
denied knowing Soble.69  Because the limitations period for an espionage 
charge had expired, Zborowski was indicted on perjury charges stemming 
from his grand jury testimony.70  Soble was the government’s principal 
witness at the trial, which ended in Zborowski’s conviction.71 
Zborowski appealed, arguing that the trial court had wrongly denied his 
request for the transcript of Soble’s grand jury testimony, thereby depriving 
him of the opportunity to impeach Soble with inconsistencies in Soble’s 
sworn statements.72  The Second Circuit panel, comprised of Judges Joseph 
Lumbard, Sterry Waterman, and Henry Friendly, agreed, reversing the 
conviction and remanding the case for a new trial.73  In its opinion, 
authored by Judge Lumbard, the court emphasized the prosecutor’s 
obligation to further the pursuit of truth, even at the possible expense of the 
government’s case: 
The prosecutor must be vigilant to see to it that full disclosure is made at 
trial of whatever may be in his possession which bears in any material 
degree on the charge for which a defendant is tried.  In the long run it is 
more important that the government disclose the truth so that justice may 
be done than that some advantage might accrue to the prosecution toward 
ensuring a conviction.74 
 
 65. See Doug Linder, The VENONA Files & the Alger Hiss Case, THE TRIALS OF ALGER 
HISS (Mar. 30, 2016), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/hissvenona.html 
[perma.cc/4Z7K-PRDK]. 
 66. See Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661. 
 67. See JOHN EARL HAYNES & HARVEY KLEHR, EARLY COLD WAR SPIES:  THE 
ESPIONAGE TRIALS THAT SHAPED AMERICAN POLITICS 212 (2006). 
 68. See Zborowski, 271 F.2d at 663–64. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. at 664. 
 71. See id. at 663. 
 72. See id. at 664–65. 
 73. See id. at 663, 668. 
 74. Id. at 668. 
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The court thus made clear that, while it would permit the government to use 
perjury charges to pursue spies who were otherwise beyond the reach of the 
law, it would not countenance prosecutorial misbehavior in furtherance of 
those efforts.  Or, as stated a different way by one district court applying 
Zborowski:  the case demonstrated the Second Circuit’s “inclination to 
strive for as many safeguards as possible in criminal prosecutions in this 
circuit[,] in order that truth may be ascertained as fully as humanly 
possible.”75 
After a retrial, Zborowski was again convicted and sentenced to four 
years in prison.76  Upon his release, he resumed his academic pursuits, 
focusing on research into the science behind pain responses.77  Zborowski 
eventually became the Director of the Pain Institute at the Mount Zion 
Hospital in San Francisco and died in 1990 at age eighty-two.78 
5.  United States v. Rosenberg 
Perhaps the most famous espionage case of all was that of Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg, who were convicted in 1951 of providing U.S. military 
secrets, including information about the construction of nuclear weapons, to 
the Soviet Union.79  Indeed, as the New York Times recently noted, even six 
decades later, the prosecution of the Rosenbergs still “remains one of 
America’s most controversial criminal cases.”80 
The principal witness against the Rosenbergs was Ethel Rosenberg’s 
brother, David Greenglass, who cooperated with the prosecution in 
exchange for a reduced sentence for himself and dismissal of espionage 
charges against his wife.81  Greenglass testified that, while he was stationed 
as a soldier at the Los Alamos atomic experimental station in New Mexico, 
Julius Rosenberg had recruited him to procure nuclear and other secrets for 
transmission to the Soviet government.82  According to Greenglass, Ethel 
Rosenberg typed up this information, as well as secrets provided by others 
in the spy ring, and also participated in Julius’s recruitment of new 
members.83 
Another prominent witness in the Rosenberg trial was Elizabeth Bentley, 
an American who had worked for many years as a high-level source for the 
 
 75. United States v. Eissner, 206 F. Supp. 103, 105 (N.D.N.Y. 1962). 
 76. See JOHN EARL HAYNES & HARVEY KLEHR, VENONA:  DECODING SOVIET ESPIONAGE 
IN AMERICA 258 (1999). 
 77. See, e.g., MARK ZBOROWSKI, PEOPLE IN PAIN (1969). 
 78. See BORIS VOLODARSKY, STALIN’S AGENT:  THE LIFE & DEATH OF ALEXANDER 
ORLOV 409 (2015). 
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Soviet Union in New York before defecting to the United States in 1945.84  
Bentley testified that a man named Julius had telephoned her on various 
occasions to provide information that she in turn passed on to her superior 
in the Soviet spy organization.85  Lastly, a Navy engineer named Max 
Elitcher also testified that Julius Rosenberg had solicited secrets from him 
concerning antiaircraft weapons and other defensive systems.86 
Both Rosenbergs took the stand in their own defense, and both 
categorically denied all allegations of espionage.87  The jury nonetheless 
found them guilty under the Espionage Act, and District Judge Irving 
Kaufman—who would later be elevated to the Second Circuit, where he 
would ultimately become Chief Judge—sentenced both Rosenbergs to die 
in the electric chair.88 
The Rosenbergs appealed on constitutional grounds, arguing, among 
other things, that the indictment violated the Sixth Amendment for 
vagueness by failing to specify that the information at issue was nonpublic 
(as they claimed was required by the Heine precedent) and that the 
Espionage Act violated the First Amendment in restricting their freedom of 
speech.89 
In an opinion authored by Judge Jerome Frank, the Second Circuit 
rejected both arguments.90  In denying the Sixth Amendment challenge, the 
court observed that the Supreme Court had rejected a nearly identical 
vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
in Gorin v. United States,91 and concluded that the Gorin ruling defeated the 
Rosenberg’s argument.92  Regarding the First Amendment issue, the court 
stated that “[t]he communication to a foreign government of secret material 
connected with the national defense can by no far-fetched reasoning be 
included within the area of First-Amendment protected free speech,” and 
opined that the true gravamen of the Rosenbergs’ argument on this point 
was the same as that underlying their Sixth Amendment argument—namely, 
vagueness—and was thus similarly barred by Gorin.93 
The Supreme Court denied the Rosenbergs’ petition for certiorari in 
November 1952.94  On June 17, 1953, Justice William Douglas granted 
them a stay of execution, but the full Supreme Court met in a special 
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session two days later, on June 19, and vacated the stay.95  The death 
sentences were carried out a few hours after the Supreme Court handed 
down its order,96 making Julius and Ethel Rosenberg the only U.S. citizens 
to be executed under the Espionage Act during the Cold War. 
In a subsequent appeal by one of the Rosenbergs’ coconspirators, Martin 
Sobell, the Second Circuit rejected several arguments that prosecutorial 
misconduct had tainted the Rosenberg trial.97  In an opinion authored by 
Judge Henry Friendly, the court held that even if the prosecution had erred 
in questioning Ethel Rosenberg about possible contradictions between her 
trial testimony and her invocation of the Fifth Amendment under 
questioning before the grand jury, that error had not violated Sobell’s 
constitutional rights.98  The court further ruled that Sobell could not argue 
on appeal that he had joined the conspiracy only after the war had ended, 
and thus was not properly subject to an enhanced sentence under the 
Espionage Act for misconduct “in time of war,” because he had not 
advanced that argument in the trial court.99 
The Rosenberg case divided the country, with many believing that the 
Rosenbergs were innocent victims of a national security state run amok.100  
Rallies were held to protest their executions, and the Pope even made an 
(ultimately fruitless) appeal to President Eisenhower to grant them 
clemency.101 
Subsequent confessions by their codefendants and recently declassified 
documents have conclusively established that Julius Rosenberg was indeed 
a Soviet spy.102  Ethel Rosenberg’s guilt, however, is far from certain:  
David Greenglass admitted in 2001 that he had testified falsely against his 
sister, Ethel, to save his own wife from prosecution.103  Grand jury 
transcripts from the testimony of other witnesses, which were unsealed in 
2008, also appear to support Ethel Rosenberg’s denials of any participation 
in Soviet espionage.104 
David Greenglass died in 2014, and a year later his grand jury testimony 
was unsealed (over the objections of both Greenglass’s family and the U.S. 
government).  The transcript revealed that until the Rosenberg trial, 
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Greenglass had consistently denied having ever spoken to Ethel Rosenberg 
on the subject of espionage.105  Had that information been disclosed to the 
Rosenbergs’ defense counsel, it could have been used to attack Greenglass’s 
credibility, perhaps changing the outcome of the case. 
6.  United States v. Drummond 
Nelson Drummond was recruited by Soviet agents while stationed at the 
U.S. Naval Headquarters in London in the late 1950s.106  For at least five 
years, he passed highly classified documents to his Soviet handlers in 
exchange for tens of thousands of dollars.107  When the FBI arrested him 
during a rendezvous with his Russian contact, Drummond was carrying 
classified documents concerning antisubmarine guided missiles, electric 
bomb fuses, and aircraft bombs.108  At trial, Drummond admitted passing 
documents to the Soviets in exchange for large cash payments.109  He was 
convicted of conspiracy under the Espionage Act and sentenced to life in 
prison.110 
On appeal, Drummond argued that he had effectively been charged with 
treason111 and thus should have been afforded the protection of Article III, 
Section 3 of the Constitution, which provides that a treason conviction 
requires the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.112  The 
Second Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected that argument, pointing out that the 
Espionage Act prohibits actions that do not constitute treason under the 
Constitution113—specifically, a defendant may be convicted under the 
Espionage Act for activities that he has “reason to believe” will have the 
effect of aiding a foreign nation (whether or not that nation is an adversary 
of the United States).114  Treason, in contrast, requires intent—not merely 
reason to believe—that a defendant’s actions will harm the United States or 
aid a foreign enemy of the nation.115 
As the opinion, written by Judge Irving Kaufman, explained, “[t]he 
differences may not be very great between intent and reason to believe, or 
between injuring our country and aiding our adversaries.  But the Supreme 
Court plainly regards them as sufficient to make the two-witness rule 
inapplicable.”116  In so holding, the court once again reaffirmed the vitality 
and flexibility of the Espionage Act as a tool to be used against leakers of 
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classified information—a purpose that it continues to serve five decades 
later.117 
B.  Use of Immigration Controls to Combat Espionage 
After World War II ended, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) assumed a major role in preventing spies and other enemy 
undesirables from harming America.  Accordingly, the Second Circuit was 
once again called upon to evaluate the legitimacy of the government’s 
tactical use of immigration law to combat national security threats. 
1.  Bejeuhr and Willumeit 
In 1949, the Second Circuit issued two decisions upholding the use of 
immigration controls as a tool to prevent German spies from remaining in 
the country after the end of open hostilities. 
In United States ex rel. Bejeuhr v. Shaughnessy,118 a German-born 
resident alien, Walter Bejeuhr, challenged his deportation as an “alien 
enemy.”119  Bejeuhr argued that neither the applicable statute nor the 
Presidential Proclamation authorizing the deportation of enemy aliens was 
still valid because the United States was no longer at war with Germany, 
and the Third Reich had been replaced by a government friendly to the 
United States.120  The Second Circuit panel, comprising Judges Harrie 
Chase, Jerome Frank, and August Hand, rejected Bejeuhr’s argument in 
favor of a broader view of the Executive’s war powers, citing a prior 
decision “that the power of the Attorney General to deport resident alien 
enemies [is] not limited to ‘times of active hostilities’ but 
continue[s] . . . until peace [i]s formally made.”121  Because the United 
States and Germany had yet to sign a peace treaty, the court held that the 
Attorney General (and thus the INS) had the power to order Bejeuhr’s 
deportation.122 
In United States ex rel. Willumeit v. Watkins,123 decided the same year, 
German Bund124 leader Otto Willumeit challenged his deportation as an 
enemy alien.  Willumeit was a naturalized American citizen when he was 
convicted under the Espionage Act in 1942.125  While serving his five-year 
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sentence on that charge, he had consented to the revocation of his U.S. 
citizenship on the ground that he had never intended to renounce allegiance 
to the German Third Reich.126  Upon his release from prison, the INS 
ordered Willumeit’s deportation as an enemy alien.127  He contested the 
order, arguing that the applicable statute only authorized the deportation of 
enemy aliens convicted of violating the Espionage Act.  Therefore, 
Willumeit argued, the INS was powerless to deport him because he was a 
U.S. citizen at the time of his conviction.128 
The Second Circuit rejected Willumeit’s argument.  In an opinion 
authored by Judge Thomas Swan, the court concluded that Congress had 
intended to authorize the deportation of persons such as Willumeit and 
declared:  “The [Espionage] Act is concerned with the deportation of 
‘undesirable’ aliens; [Willumeit] is an alien, and by reason of his conviction 
may be found to be an ‘undesirable resident’ of the United States whether 
he was an alien or a citizen when the crime was committed.”129 
Willumeit appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the Second 
Circuit’s ruling, holding that “[t]here is no question as to the power of 
Congress to enact a statute to deport aliens because of past misconduct.  
That is what Congress did in [the statute at issue here], and there is no 
occasion to restrict its language so as to narrow its plain meaning.”130 
With the Bejeuhr and Willumeit opinions, the Second Circuit made clear 
that spies for foreign governments could not rely on technicalities to escape 
deportation.  The court would soon issue a similar ruling regarding evidence 
seized by the INS in arresting a spy. 
2.  United States v. Abel 
Rudolf Abel was a colonel in the KGB, the espionage agency of the 
Soviet Union.131  He entered the United States illegally by crossing the 
Canadian border in 1948 and spent the next ten years spying for the Soviet 
Union inside the United States.132  In 1957, one of his coconspirators 
defected to the United States and identified Abel to the FBI as a Soviet 
spy.133  The defector refused to testify against Abel, however, and so the 
FBI, lacking sufficient evidence to prosecute Abel for espionage, notified 
the INS that he was in the country illegally.134  FBI and INS agents 
assembled at the New York hotel where Abel was staying and, after a brief 
period of questioning by the FBI during which Abel refused to cooperate, 
the INS arrested him.135 
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The INS agents conducted a search incident to arrest, seizing various 
documents pertaining to Abel’s citizenship:  a birth certificate, a passport, 
and the like.136  The agents then offered Abel the opportunity to pack 
anything he wished to take with him and to check out of the hotel.137  Abel 
agreed and, as he was packing, the agents caught him trying to slip three 
pieces of paper into his sleeve.138  The agents promptly seized the papers he 
was attempting to hide.139  They then helped Abel check out of the hotel, 
whereupon they transported him to INS headquarters.140  The FBI 
subsequently searched Abel’s vacated hotel room and found two items in a 
trash can that turned out to be espionage tools:  a hollowed-out pencil 
containing microfilm and a block of wood containing a cipher pad.141 
Abel was subsequently charged with violating the Espionage Act.142  At 
his trial, the government introduced one of the pieces of paper that Abel had 
tried to hide on his person, which bore a coded message, as well as the two 
items that the FBI had retrieved from the trash can.143  Abel was convicted 
and sentenced to thirty years in prison.  He appealed his conviction, arguing 
that the INS had illegally searched his hotel room for evidence of 
espionage, when they were merely permitted to search for weapons that 
might endanger their safety or evidence of Abel’s alienage status, the only 
issue properly within the INS’s purview.144  In effect, Abel argued that the 
government had used the INS to circumvent the criminal warrant 
requirements that would have applied to an FBI search for evidence of 
espionage. 
The Second Circuit panel of Judges Charles Clark, Joseph Lumbard, and 
Sterry Waterman rejected Abel’s argument.145  As a threshold issue, the 
court held that the INS had the power to conduct a search incident to arrest 
even though its arrest warrant was administratively issued by the INS 
Commissioner rather than by a judge.146  The court went on to hold that the 
INS agents had acted in good faith by searching only for documents 
relevant to the alienage question.147  As to the three pieces of paper that 
Abel had actively tried to conceal from the agents, those documents were 
not mere evidence of a crime, but rather, the very “instrumentalities and 
means” by which Abel was committing the crime of espionage.148  As the 
court pointed out, federal agents are empowered to seize such 
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instrumentalities and means when discovered in the course of a search 
incident to arrest.149 
Abel appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the Second 
Circuit’s ruling, observing that to do otherwise would be to unduly hamper 
government agencies’ ability to cooperate in the prosecution of violations of 
law.  Specifically, the Court held that the Second Circuit was “justified in 
not finding[] that the administrative warrant was here employed as an 
instrument of criminal law enforcement to circumvent the latter’s legal 
restrictions, rather than as a bona fide preliminary step in a deportation 
proceeding.”150 
While Abel’s capture and conviction were major media and propaganda 
events during the Cold War, Abel only served a short portion of his criminal 
sentence before being released to the Soviets in a prisoner exchange for 
downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers.151 
In its postwar opinions delineating the scope and limitations of the 
Espionage Act and of the federal government’s power to use immigration 
statutes to prosecute suspected spies, the Second Circuit struck a vital 
balance between the government’s national security mandate and the 
fundamental rights of individuals accused of crimes against the United 
States.  In so doing, the court set a powerful example of courage and 
integrity in the face of intense public and political pressure. 
II.  THE RESPONSE TO GLOBAL TERRORISM 
Decades after the Second Circuit’s landmark espionage decisions, a new 
threat emerged.  On September 1, 1992, two men identifying themselves as 
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj arrived at New York’s 
John F. Kennedy International Airport from Karachi, Pakistan.152  Less than 
six months later, Yousef and others attacked the World Trade Center by 
igniting a massive bomb that they had hidden in a van and parked in the 
complex’s underground garage.153  The detonation occurred on an 
otherwise normal Friday, at 12:18 p.m. on February 26, 1993, as tens of 
thousands of people were going about their business or enjoying the lunch 
hour.154  As the explosion echoed through the caverns of Lower Manhattan, 
the blast ripped through the thick walls and girders that supported Tower 
One, the northernmost of the pair, and sent billows of white smoke into the 
thin winter air.155  Six victims were murdered in the attack, more than 1,000 
were injured, and the nation was traumatized.156 
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More terror would follow.  Months after the bombing, the FBI arrested a 
team of jihadists, led by a blind Islamic cleric named Sheikh Omar Abdel 
Rahman, for planning even more colossal attacks on New York City 
landmarks and infrastructure.157  Meanwhile, less than two years after the 
World Trade Center bombing, on the other side of the globe, authorities in 
the Philippines thwarted a meticulous plot to bomb a dozen U.S. 
commercial jets flying over Southeast Asia.158  The plot’s ringleader turned 
out to be Yousef, who had fled New York after the World Trade Center 
attack.159 
Inspiring all of this destruction was a Saudi named Usama Bin Laden 
who, through an organization he had created called al Qaeda, had taught 
Yousef and Ajaj how to make the World Trade Center bomb, had sent 
Rahman to America, and by February 1998 was publicly calling on all 
Muslims to murder U.S. civilians around the world.160  Later that year, al 
Qaeda attacked the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, murdering 224 
people; it bombed the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen’s Aden Harbor in October 
2000, killing seventeen U.S. service members; and on September 11, 2001, 
al Qaeda returned to Yousef’s original target and carried out the most 
murderous terrorist attack in history.161  The mastermind of the September 
11, 2001 attacks was Yousef’s uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—the two 
had worked together in the Philippines on the foiled airplane plot.162 
Against this harrowing backdrop of mass murder, one convicted terrorist 
after another appeared before the Second Circuit.  In all, more than twenty-
five of the world’s most notorious terrorists sought relief from the court.  
First came four of Yousef’s confederates in the 1993 World Trade Center 
attack.163  Next, it was Rahman and nine of his followers for the plot 
against other New York City targets.164  Yousef and two others followed 
for their roles in attacking the World Trade Center in 1993 and the airplanes 
plot in the Philippines.165  Then came the appeals of those involved in the 
attacks of the embassies in East Africa.166  Many more would follow. 
Given this docket, it is tempting to define the Second Circuit’s 
jurisprudence in the sphere of terrorism by reference to the sheer magnitude 
of the cases heard, the notoriety of the terrorist appellants, and the death and 
destruction that occurred or was planned by the defendants in these cases.  
Indeed, no other court in the nation’s history has brought finality to as many 
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vitally important terrorism cases.  Deeper examination, however, reveals a 
legacy that is even more profound. 
Two characteristics stand out:  First, the manner in which the court 
resolved these appeals was consistently brilliant in its understatement.167  
As the nation waged controversial wars, as the threat of Islamic terrorism 
was by turns underplayed and overplayed, and as politics clouded policy 
making, the court methodically addressed each claim of every convicted 
terrorist that came before it in such painstaking detail that the opinions it 
produced represent a triumph of sober legal analysis over external influence 
of any sort.168  The decisions allow the magnitude of the facts to speak for 
themselves, neither exaggerating the drama and emotion of the subject 
matter nor eliding the gravity of the allegations.  No convictions were 
overturned, but each decision found its conclusions along a path of 
unwavering fairness, administering justice in the highest traditions of the 
bench, and announcing to the parties—indeed, to the world—that even in 
the most odious of cases, the rule of law still prevails. 
Second, the legal guidance drawn from these opinions has far-reaching 
practical significance of enduring value.169  These were a new and different 
breed of national security cases, presenting a bevy of novel legal issues 
relating to the nature and scope of the threat and the challenges associated 
with countering it.  The cases involved conduct planned or carried out 
overseas, raising questions about the reach of U.S. criminal law and the 
application of the Constitution and standard U.S. investigatory procedures 
in foreign lands.  The underlying investigative landscape of the cases often 
saw traditional law enforcement techniques blend with highly secretive 
methods of intelligence gathering, calling for a delicate calibration of 
national security interests in light of the trial rights of the accused and the 
privacy rights of the general public.  In resolving these and other issues of 
first impression, the Second Circuit set precedents for its sister courts, gave 
law enforcement authorities a roadmap for how terrorism cases should be 
investigated, signaled to intelligence officials that sensitive sources and 
methods could be protected in the context of a public trial, and guaranteed 
to the accused and their counsel that their trials would be fair.  As such, the 
decisions fortified a backbone of federal national security law that would 
establish Article III courts as the forum of utmost reliability for the 
prosecution of suspected terrorists. 
The Second Circuit’s work in resolving the nation’s most significant 
body of terrorism cases reflects a contribution to the principles of national 
security and the rule of law that is nothing short of monumental.  The cases 
of greatest consequence are highlighted in Part II.A.  Part II.B discusses the 
lasting practical impact of the court’s decisions, within the Second Circuit 
and beyond. 
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A.  The Foundational Cases 
The Second Circuit’s review of the four landmark terrorism prosecutions 
discussed below established norms for handling such cases through their 
investigative, trial, and appellate phases. 
1.  United States v. Salameh 
Despite the huge crater in the hull of the World Trade Center and the two 
million gallons of water that gushed from severed pipes into the subgrade 
levels, not all traces of the 1993 bomb were irretrievably buried beneath the 
tons of debris.170  The forensic investigation team found, for example, 
pieces of a Ford Econoline 350 cargo van with unique explosives damage, 
showing that it was blown apart in opposite directions and suggesting that it 
was the vehicle that held the bomb.171  One of those pieces contained the 
vehicle identification number (LHA 75633), which the FBI traced to a 
Ryder truck rental franchise in Jersey City, New Jersey.172  As it turned out, 
three days before the bombing, the van was leased to an individual named 
Mohammed Salameh, who had told the rental agent that he would need it 
for five days.173  Salameh left a $400 deposit.174 
Salameh, a Jersey City resident, was Yousef’s contact in the United 
States.175  Yousef’s travel companion, Ajaj, did not clear customs:  he was 
arrested for passport fraud upon arrival and suspected of worse, given his 
possession of a then-unexplainable set of bomb-making manuals and 
handwritten notebooks.176  Yousef, on the other hand, was permitted to 
enter the country, and within days had moved in with Salameh.177  Over the 
next several months, Yousef and Salameh carried out the plan to attack the 
World Trade Center, maintaining steady contact with Ajaj through prison 
visits and calls, and enlisting the assistance of others, including Nidal 
Ayyad, an Allied Signal engineer, and Mahmoud Abouhalima, an Egyptian 
who had attended the Khalden terrorist training camp in Afghanistan before 
returning to New York to drive a taxicab.178  On February 26, 1993—after 
acquiring all the necessary bomb components, hiding them in a Jersey City 
storage shed, and building the bomb in a Jersey City apartment—the 
terrorists loaded the bomb into the Ryder van, parked it underneath the 
World Trade Center, and watched the ensuing death and destruction from 
the Jersey City waterfront.179  Yousef and Abouhalima left the country 
 
 170. See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 107–08 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 
 171. See id. at 113. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. at 108. 
 174. See Ralph Blumenthal, The Twin Towers:  The Investigation; Insistence on Refund 
for a Truck Results in an Arrest in Explosion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1993), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1993/03/05/nyregion/twin-towers-investigation-insistence-refund-for-
truck-results-arrest-explosion.html?pagewanted=all [perma.cc/P2Q8-XNG3]. 
 175. See Salameh, 152 F.3d at 107. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. at 107–08. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. at 108. 
2016] SECOND CIRCUIT AND NATIONAL SECURITY 203 
immediately.180  Salameh planned to do the same, but he decided to do one 
last thing before departing.181 
In what the Second Circuit would later describe as a “ludicrous mistake,” 
Salameh returned to the Ryder leasing agent in Jersey City to collect his 
$400 deposit, claiming that the van had been stolen.182  The FBI was there 
to greet him with handcuffs.183  After Ayyad was also arrested in New 
Jersey, and Abouhalima was captured in Egypt and sent back to the United 
States, the two men joined Salameh and Ajaj as the first four defendants 
tried for the bombing of the World Trade Center.184  After a six-month trial 
involving more than 1,000 exhibits and the testimony of more than 200 
witnesses, each of the defendants was convicted on all counts and sentenced 
to life in prison.185 
The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions on August 4, 1998, three 
days before al Qaeda would attack the U.S. embassies in East Africa.186  In 
the annals of appellate jurisprudence, few appeals have presented, to use the 
court’s words, such a “congeries of arguments.”187  The panel of Judges 
Thomas Meskill, Joseph McLaughlin, and Guido Calabresi allowed two full 
days for oral argument, a more than generous allotment for each defendant 
to voice his myriad claims.  The 124-page written opinion, which was 
issued per curiam,188 analyzed and disposed of no fewer than fifty-four 
claims of error, covering virtually every aspect of the long and complicated 
trial.  There were, for example, challenges to how the jury was selected and 
how it was instructed on the law prior to its deliberations.189  Each 
defendant claimed that evidence incriminating him should have been 
suppressed because it was collected in violation of the Constitution or was 
unfairly prejudicial.190  There were challenges to countless evidentiary 
items and aspects of the testimony.191  Abouhalima and Ajaj claimed that 
the evidence against them was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty 
verdicts.192  Salameh and Abouhalima contended that it was improper for 
the government to introduce a Jersey City gas station attendant’s pretrial 
identification of them together, filling up a Ryder van with gas hours before 
the bombing, after the bewildered attendant failed to identify them in the 
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courtroom.193  Abouhalima, who alone raised more than two dozen 
appellate issues, claimed that the statements he made to the FBI suggesting 
familiarity with Yousef and the bomb plot should have been excluded as the 
involuntary product of torture by the Egyptian government.194 
The written opinion marched through every issue, thoroughly 
deliberating each one as if the appeal concerned it alone.  Such attention 
was arguably undeserved—not because the appellants had committed acts 
of unfathomable evil, but because so many of the claims plainly lacked 
merit under the law.  A more abbreviated analysis would ordinarily have 
sufficed for all but a handful of the claims.  Nevertheless, the horrific 
subject matter of the appeal required something more, and, in this sense, the 
decision’s lasting achievement is the extraordinary care with which the 
court tended to each corner of the vast legal expanse before it, sending a 
clear message that every defendant—no matter who he is or what he has 
done—will be accorded the benefits of the rule of law and the protection of 
the Constitution. 
2.  United States v. Rahman 
A year later, on August 16, 1999, the Second Circuit resolved its second 
monumental terrorism appeal, again in a cogent and comprehensive per 
curiam written opinion and again after the panel—consisting of Judges Jon 
Newman, Pierre Leval, and Fred Parker—devoted two full days to oral 
argument.195  The appeal presented a litany of claims advanced by ten 
defendants convicted of participating in a seditious conspiracy to, in the 
words of the court, “wage a war of urban terrorism against the United States 
and forcibly to oppose its authority.”196  The FBI disrupted the plot 
midstream, arresting the group four months after the World Trade Center 
bombing.197  By that time, however, the defendants had, either alone or in 
concert, assisted in the murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane, a former member of 
the Israeli parliament and founder of the Jewish Defense League; plotted to 
assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during an official visit to 
New York; provided assistance to Yousef and Salameh in carrying out the 
World Trade Center bombing; and begun building bombs for attacks on 
New York City buildings and tunnels.198  After a nine-month trial, in which 
the defendants alone called more than seventy witnesses, two of the 
defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment and the others received 
prison terms ranging in length from twenty-five to fifty-seven years.199 
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The blind Egyptian cleric Rahman was one of those who received a life 
sentence.200  The leader of the conspiracy and central figure in the case, 
Rahman had achieved prominence in jihadist circles for his denunciation of 
his homeland’s secularism and its ties to “infidel” governments such as the 
United States.201  In the 1970s, he had led an Egyptian terrorist organization 
known as al-Gama’a al-Islamiya (“the Islamic Group” or “al-Gama’a”) 
which, nearly three decades later, would murder fifty-eight tourists in 
Luxor, Egypt, in a warped bid for Rahman’s release from U.S. custody.202 
In the mid-1980s, Egypt expelled Rahman on suspicion that one of his 
fatwas had led to the assassination of President Anwar Sadat.203  Rahman 
went to Afghanistan, where he forged a close alliance with Bin Laden, 
eventually becoming heavily involved in al Qaeda’s precursor organization, 
the international recruiting and fundraising outfit known as Maktab al-
Khadamat.  In 1990, as Bin Laden rose to prominence in Afghanistan, 
Rahman came to New York to run Maktab al-Khadamat’s U.S. franchise in 
Brooklyn, New York.204  Awaiting Rahman was a group of followers who 
had already begun “to organize [a] jihad army in New York.”205 
The significance of the Second Circuit’s opinion in the case against 
Rahman and his coconspirators extends beyond the men themselves, as the 
decision is widely cited by modern courts and academics alike for its 
holdings on topics ranging from the limits of expert testimony on Islamic 
law,206 to regulating the government’s use of informants,207 and even to the 
scope of the passport fraud statute.208  The court’s affirmance of Rahman’s 
convictions, however, was the apex of its achievement, for while Rahman 
represented a clear threat to the nation’s security, he also mounted a 
credible constitutional challenge to his conviction.209  Rahman had led the 
conspiracy from an elevated position, insulating himself from the day-to-
day terrorist planning.210  The evidence against him therefore consisted 
largely of his statements to his followers.211  This gave Rahman an 
opportunity to argue that he was being punished solely for his speech and 
ideas, in violation of constitutionally protected freedoms.212 
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The claim required a deep examination of the role of religion in the 
conspiracy and the significance of Rahman’s statements to his followers.213  
The court found the conspiracy to be premised on “jihad,” in the sense of a 
struggle against the enemies of Islam, and saw Rahman’s speeches as 
indicative of this purpose.214  The court cited, for example, Rahman’s 
instruction that followers were to “do jihad with the sword, with the 
cannon, with the grenades, with the missile . . . against God’s enemies.”215  
A follower was told by Rahman to “make up with God . . . by turning his 
rifle’s barrel” on President Mubarak.216  Statements like these were, in the 
court’s analysis, calls to violence shrouded in religious garb. 
Against this backdrop, Rahman’s constitutional claims rang hollow, 
because, as the court explained, freedoms of speech and of religion, while 
fundamental rights, “do not extend so far as to bar prosecution of one who 
uses a public speech or a religious ministry to commit crimes.”217  The 
court went on to offer context: 
Of course, courts must be vigilant to insure that prosecutions are not 
improperly based on the mere expression of unpopular ideas.  But if the 
evidence shows that the speeches crossed the line into criminal 
solicitation, procurement of criminal activity, or conspiracy to violate the 
laws, the prosecution is permissible.218 
Rahman had crossed the line.  His “speeches were not simply the 
expression of ideas” but rather, in some instances, “constituted the crime of 
conspiracy to wage war on the United States . . . and solicitation of attack 
on the United States military installations, as well as of the murder of 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.”219  Given that Rahman was also in 
constant contact with other members of the conspiracy—including the 
World Trade Center bombers in the weeks before the 1993 attack—and that 
Rahman was looked to as a leader, the court found ample basis for 
affirming his convictions and sentence.220 
To the extent that Rahman’s notoriety remained in question, a sad and 
gruesome postscript removed any doubt.  Lynne Stewart, the lawyer who 
had represented Rahman through his trial and appeal and a respected 
member of the bar who had appeared before the Second Circuit regularly as 
an advocate, was herself convicted of providing material support to a 
terrorist conspiracy that Rahman supported from prison.221  The aim of the 
conspiracy was to incite members of Rahman’s Egyptian terrorist group, al-
Gama’a, to commit murder overseas.  According to many, including the 
U.S. government, it was this conspiracy that resulted in the massacre at the 
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Luxor in November 1997, during which the al-Gama’a terrorists left leaflets 
on the bodies of the Luxor victims, demanding Rahman’s release from 
custody.222 
Stewart, as Rahman’s counsel, was one of only a handful of people who 
could communicate with him in prison, and she used that privilege to 
smuggle messages from Rahman to members of al-Gama’a, communicating 
Rahman’s withdrawal of support for a cease-fire between al-Gama’a and 
the Egyptian government.223  In affirming Stewart’s conviction, the panel of 
Circuit Judges Robert Sack, Guido Calabresi, and John Walker found that 
Rahman’s “participation” and “leadership” in the conspiracy would have 
been impossible without Stewart’s support.224 
3.  United States v. Yousef 
On January 6, 1995, at approximately 10:45 p.m. local time in the 
Philippines, a security guard at the Josefa apartment complex in Manila 
noticed Ramzi Yousef and another man, Abdul Hakim Murad, running 
down the stairs from their sixth-floor apartment carrying their shoes.225  At 
the same time, neighbors noticed smoke rising from the windows of unit 
603, which Yousef had rented a month earlier using a false name.226  Local 
firemen and police were called and determined that the occupants of unit 
603 had accidently ignited a fire when mixing bomb-making ingredients in 
the kitchen sink.227  The authorities found cartons of chemicals in the 
apartment, as well as Casio timers, wristwatches with wires attached, and a 
laptop computer.228 
Murad was arrested when he returned to the apartment:  Yousef had sent 
him back to retrieve a laptop.229  When it was clear that Murad would not 
return, Yousef fled to Pakistan, the same sanctuary he had used after 
bombing the World Trade Center two years earlier.230 
A robust international investigation led by the FBI revealed that Yousef 
had been in Manila since mid-1994 to carry out an elaborate plan to destroy 
U.S. commercial airliners in midair.231  The plot, laid out in horrifying 
detail on the laptop that Yousef had sent Murad to retrieve, called for 
operatives to place bombs aboard twelve U.S.-flagged airplanes serving 
routes originating in Southeast Asia.232  Each of the participants would 
board a preselected flight and assemble a time bomb during the journey’s 
first leg.233  After the operative disembarked at a stopover, the bomb would 
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explode during the second leg.234  The United States was the ultimate 
destination of eleven of the flights, with each of the targeted planes capable 
of carrying up to 280 people.235 
Preparations for the attack were comprehensive and had lethal intentions.  
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—Yousef’s uncle, who would later supervise the 
September 11, 2001 attacks—joined Yousef in Manila for two months in 
mid-1994, and together they mixed bomb-making chemicals and built 
timing devices.236  On December 1, 1994, Yousef and a man named Wali 
Khan Amin Shah conducted a test run by placing a bomb under a patron’s 
seat at a Manila movie theater.237  It exploded as planned, injuring several 
people.238  Ten days later, Yousef tested another bomb on a Philippines 
Airlines flight from Manila to Tokyo with an intermediate stop in Cebu, 
Philippines.239  After Yousef disembarked in Cebu, the bomb went off 
during the second leg of the flight, killing a Japanese businessman.240 
The successes of Yousef’s trial runs make clear that, if not for the mishap 
in unit 603, Yousef likely would have accomplished another colossal act of 
terror.  Instead, he was captured a month later in Islamabad, Pakistan, 
turned over to U.S. authorities, and sent to New York to face charges for 
both the plot in Manila and the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.241  
He had two separate trials, in 1996 and 1997, each four months long.  
Murad and Shah were his codefendants for the first trial, for their 
involvement in the airline plot; Eyad Ismoil, a Jordanian who drove the 
Ryder van into the World Trade Center garage, was his codefedant the 
second.242  The juries convicted all defendants in both cases, and Yousef 
received a life sentence plus 240 years.243 
Yousef’s appeal raised so many issues that the government’s brief in 
opposition bulged to an unprecedented 634 pages in length.  The Second 
Circuit responded with a mammoth opinion of its own, determining that the 
convictions and sentences were all solidly grounded.  Anchoring the 
opinion, jointly authored by Judges Ralph Winter, John Walker, and José 
Cabranes, was a scholarly account of the legal justification for prosecuting 
Yousef and Murad in the United States for conduct that took place 
overseas.244  Yousef’s claims withered under the court’s analysis, which 
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explained why the prosecution was authorized by the relevant statutes and 
within the bounds of the U.S. Constitution and customary international law.  
Explaining how the charges did not offend due process, the court stated: 
The defendants conspired to attack a dozen United States-flag aircraft in 
an effort to inflict injury on this country and its people and influence 
American foreign policy, and their attack on the Philippine Airlines flight 
was a “test-run” in furtherance of this conspiracy.  Given the substantial 
intended effect of their attack on the United States and its citizens, it 
cannot be argued seriously that the defendants’ conduct was so unrelated 
to American interests as to render their prosecution in the United States 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.  As a consequence, we conclude that 
prosecuting the defendants in the United States did not violate the Due 
Process Clause.245 
The court dispensed with the remaining claims one after another, 
dispassionately delving into the facts and applying the law with acuity.  The 
opinion concluded by stating definitively that the “fairness of the 
proceedings” in the trial court was “beyond doubt.”246  The Supreme Court 
apparently agreed, denying Yousef’s petition for certiorari a few months 
later.247 
4.  In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa 
Mohamed Al-’Owhali, Mohamed Odeh, and Wadih El-Hage, were 
convicted of crimes related to the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.  Their appeal 
required the Second Circuit to evaluate the prosecution of these three Bin 
Laden disciples in the context of the government’s broader efforts to 
contain an increasingly brazen terrorist organization that was maturing into 
a serious threat to America’s security.248 
The six-month trial, held in early 2001, revealed a terrorist conspiracy 
dating back to the late 1980s, when Bin Laden used al Qaeda to congregate 
a band of Islamic radicals brimming with enthusiasm over the Afghan 
mujahidin’s victory over the Soviets.249  Bin Laden rallied the group around 
 
 245. Id. at 112.  On the question of customary international law, the Second Circuit held 
that the trial court had erroneously concluded that the acts charged in one of the counts were 
offenses against the law of nations that supported the exercise of universal jurisdiction. See 
id. at 99.  The court ruled that customary international law, at that time, did not provide for 
the prosecution of “terrorist” acts under the universality principle, in part due to the failure of 
states to achieve anything like consensus on the definition of terrorism. See id. at 103–08.  
The court nonetheless held that Yousef’s prosecution on the count in question was both 
consistent with and required by the United States’s treaty obligations and domestic laws. See 
id. at 108–11. 
 246. Id. at 173. 
 247. See Yousef v. United States, 540 U.S. 933 (2003). 
 248. See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 
2008) (In re Terrorist Bombings I); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 
552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008) (In re Terrorist Bombings II) (Fourth Amendment challenges); 
In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2008) (In re 
Terrorist Bombings III) (Fifth Amendment challenges). 
 249. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 160, at 152–54. 
210 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
the pursuit of a global caliphate, or Islamic government.  In secret 
discussions with his team of in-house “clerics,” Bin Laden blended violence 
with religious doctrine, twisting the holiest of Islamic texts into a 
justification for mass murder.250  He reached out to like-minded jihadists 
around the world in early 1998 by publishing a “fatwa” that proclaimed all 
Muslims had a duty to kill American civilians anywhere they could be 
found.251  The first major salvo of Bin Laden’s global war came later that 
year in Africa.252  As the rubble of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 
still smoldered, al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks as acts in 
furtherance of Bin Laden’s distorted Islamic crusade.253 
Al-’Owhali, a British-born Saudi from a wealthy family, was dispatched 
by al Qaeda to Kenya days before the bombing.254  He had trained for the 
operation for years in Afghanistan, learning about explosives and urban 
warfare at the same al Qaeda camp (Khalden) where Yousef, Ajaj, and 
Abouhalima had trained.255  On the morning of the attack, Al-’Owhali rode 
in the passenger seat of the truck that delivered the bomb.256  Although he 
had planned to become a martyr in the explosion along with the truck’s 
driver, Al-’Owhali jumped out at the last moment and ran from the scene, 
suffering only slight injuries from the blast.257  A few days later, he was 
arrested at a local hotel, interrogated by Kenyan and American authorities, 
and eventually sent to the United States for trial.258  Al-’Owhali was 
convicted of all counts and was sentenced to life in prison, after the jury 
failed to reach unanimity on the death penalty.259 
Odeh, a longstanding al Qaeda member of Palestinian descent, had been 
in East Africa as part of al Qaeda’s team that built the bombs and planned 
the attacks.260  He fled to Pakistan the night before the bombings, but was 
arrested there for traveling under a false name.261  Odeh was sent back to 
Kenya a week later, after explosive residue was detected on his clothing and 
luggage.262  Upon his return, he was arrested and interrogated by Kenyan 
and American authorities.263  A search of his home revealed a crude 
drawing of the Nairobi embassy depicting a truck at the optimum location 
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to deliver the bomb.264  At his trial in New York, Odeh was also convicted 
on all counts and sentenced to life in prison.265 
The third appellant, El-Hage, was a naturalized U.S. citizen and thus 
presented unique legal questions.266  Born in Lebanon, El-Hage moved to 
the United States as a young man and studied urban planning at a college in 
Louisiana.267  He veered into radicalism, however, after falling in with 
Sheikh Rahman’s group in Brooklyn.268  Shortly before the World Trade 
Center attack, El-Hage left the United States to work for al Qaeda in the 
Sudan, where he became one of Bin Laden’s closest confidants.269  Though 
he did not participate in planning the attack on the Nairobi embassy—he 
had moved back to the United States a year before the bombings—the trial 
evidence showed that El-Hage joined Bin Laden’s conspiracy to kill 
Americans by, among other things, embracing al Qaeda’s violent anti-
American agenda, performing essential functions for the organization, and 
lying about his connections to Bin Laden and al Qaeda during two rounds 
of testimony before a federal grand jury in New York City.270  El-Hage was 
arrested in New York at the conclusion of the second grand-jury session, a 
month after the embassies were attacked.271  At trial, he was convicted on 
all counts (including seventeen counts of perjury) and sentenced to life in 
prison.272 
The scope and complexity of the appeals in the embassy cases merited 
three separate opinions (all authored by Judge José Cabranes), an 
unprecedented step for the Second Circuit.273  In the end, the court affirmed 
all of the convictions and sentences, with the exception of El-Hage’s life 
sentence, which it ordered the trial court to recalculate in light of an 
intervening change in the law (which nevertheless remained a life sentence 
upon recalculation).274 
Apart from the staggering number of issues presented and the depth of 
the analysis required to resolve them,275 the court’s three opinions 
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concerning the East Africa embassy bombings charted new territory for 
federal courts dealing with the increasingly challenging landscape of 
international terrorism.  While the Second Circuit was repeatedly 
confronted with the exhaustive and heroic efforts of the American national 
security officials charged with the breathtakingly important mission to stop 
Bin Laden and al Qaeda, just as vital was the court’s responsibility to guard 
the rights and freedoms of the accused.  The opinions honored all of those 
interests, however much in tension, with equal vigilance. 
A perfect example was El-Hage’s claim that his constitutional privacy 
rights were violated by a covert spying operation in Kenya that produced 
incriminating evidence used against him at trial.276  El-Hage had a strong 
argument:  he was an American citizen abroad; the surveillance included 
extensive wiretaps of his phones and a search of his home; and none of it 
was preauthorized by a court, as would normally be required for searches 
that produce trial evidence.277  But the government had its own strong 
interest:  the surveillance of El-Hage was part of a larger operation to gather 
intelligence on Bin Laden and al Qaeda, an operation so vital to national 
security that disturbing it to obtain court authorization was thought to be out 
of the question, even if it meant forgoing trial evidence.278  The Second 
Circuit drilled through the competing claims to the principal question of 
law:  whether preauthorization in the form of a court-issued warrant was 
required for overseas searches targeting U.S. citizens.279  In resolving this 
question of first impression, the court mined relevant legal precedent, the 
history of U.S. diplomatic relations, and the practical realities of overseas 
evidence collection.280  The court’s resolution struck a careful balance 
among the competing interests:  while the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures does not require the government 
to obtain a warrant before conducting foreign searches, the searches must be 
reasonable, upon retrospective review, for the evidence to be used at 
trial.281  In El-Hage’s case, after carefully examining how the searches were 
conducted, the court concluded that they were reasonable.282 
Similarly vexing legal questions permeated other aspects of the appeal, 
each requiring calibration of the balance between individual rights and 
national security imperatives.  In its concluding thoughts, the court 
recognized the trial judge’s “conscientious efforts to ensure that the rights 
of [the] defendants and the needs of national security were equally met 
 
any recorded statement of a witness.  Later, when the prosecutors became aware of the tapes 
and disclosed them to the defendants, El-Hage asked for a new trial, a demand that the trial 
court rejected after an extensive hearing.  In affirming that ruling, the Second Circuit 
recognized “the liberty interests that El-Hage has at stake” but was able to “state with 
confidence” that the material on the tapes, whether taken individually or as a whole, would 
most likely not have changed the result at trial. Id. at 146. 
 276. See In re Terrorist Bombings II, 552 F.3d at 167–76. 
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 280. See id. at 167–76. 
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during these proceedings.”283  The three comprehensive appellate opinions 
in the East Africa embassy cases demonstrate that the Second Circuit 
achieved the same goal.284 
B.  The Resulting Framework for the Prosecution 
of International Terrorists Consistent with the Rule of Law 
The Second Circuit’s decisions have reverberated through the nation’s 
most significant terrorism trials—from that of Zacarias Moussaoui, 
convicted in Virginia of participating in the al Qaeda conspiracy that 
resulted in the attacks on September 11, 2001; to Jose Padilla, convicted in 
Miami for his work with al Qaeda; to the accomplices of Najibullah Zazi, 
convicted in Brooklyn of plotting the September 2009 attack on the New 
York City subway system; to Sulaiman Abu Ghayth and Khaled al-
Fawwaz, convicted in Manhattan for carrying out, in a number of ways, al 
Qaeda’s murderous conspiracy against Americans; and even to Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev, convicted of the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.  The 
standards set by the Second Circuit have, moreover, regularly factored into 
the decisions of U.S. policymakers in determining how best to incapacitate 
threats to the nation without undue risk of disclosing sensitive sources and 
methods. 
In this sense, the legacy of the Second Circuit’s monumental early 
rulings is that they established a playbook for sister courts and generations 
of participants in the prosecution and defense of accused terrorists. 
1.  Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism 
United States v. Yousef,285 for example, is frequently cited by courts286 
and academic commentators287 grappling with the tricky question of 
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 285. 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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whether U.S. criminal laws apply to conduct occurring abroad, an 
increasingly common issue in an ever more interconnected world.288  The 
basic rule is that U.S. laws are presumed to apply only to domestic conduct 
unless Congress has said otherwise—and when a law does apply to 
extraterritorial conduct, the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction must comport with 
constitutional requirements of due process.  Yousef’s appeal from his 
convictions for the airline plot in Southeast Asia presented one of the first 
challenges to the extraterritorial application of the statutes in question.289 
Notably, the court’s opinion clarified the doctrine with respect to the 
overseas application of the conspiracy statute, which, on its face, gave no 
indication of Congress’s intent.290  To resolve the question, the court 
inferred that, where Congress intended U.S. jurisdiction over a substantive 
crime (in this case, bombing civilian aircraft), it was “reasonable to 
conclude that Congress also intended to vest in United States courts the 
requisite jurisdiction over an extraterritorial conspiracy to commit that 
crime.”291 
Likewise, courts have followed the Second Circuit’s lead in determining 
what process is due when a defendant is required to answer for overseas 
conduct in a U.S. court.  For example, Monzer Al Kassar, a Spanish arms 
trafficker long targeted by the international law enforcement community, 
was finally convicted in New York after agreeing to sell surface-to-air 
missiles to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration informants posing as 
operatives of a Colombian terrorist organization.292  Kassar claimed on 
appeal that the statutes under which he was convicted failed to provide 
sufficient notice that his foreign conduct could be punished in the United 
States.293  Second Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs, writing for the court, agreed 
that notice was the primary due process requirement but found the 
requirement satisfied as to Kassar:  “Fair warning does not require that the 
defendants understand that they could be subject to criminal prosecution in 
the United States so long as they would reasonably understand that their 
conduct was criminal and would subject them to prosecution 
somewhere.”294  It naturally followed that Kassar had sufficient warning, 
especially where he had been told by the informants that the weapons 
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would be used to destroy U.S. property.295  The Fourth Circuit and the D.C. 
Circuit are among the courts that have since embraced this analysis.296 
Of equal importance, particularly as theaters of war against terrorists 
dotted the globe with growing regularity, was the Second Circuit’s decision 
not to treat overseas war zones as an exception to the settled principles of 
extraterritoriality.  The issue was first raised before the court by a Pakistani 
scientist and MIT graduate named Aafia Siddiqui, who attempted to kill 
U.S. military officers with one of their own rifles as they prepared to 
interrogate her in Afghanistan.297  In an opinion authored by Judge Richard 
Wesley, the court rejected Siddiqui’s claim that U.S. criminal law could not 
reach her “in an active theater of war,” finding no logic in the argument.298  
Given that the laws in question were aimed at protecting U.S. officers and 
employees, the court found that it would be “incongruous” to conclude that 
they “did not apply in areas of conflict where large numbers of officers and 
employees operate.”299 
2.  Defining the Criminal Implications  
of al Qaeda Membership 
While bedrock constitutional principles guarantee the freedom to 
associate with any organization, even a criminal one, this protection does 
not extend to individuals who provide material support to terrorist 
organizations.  Further, when support for a terrorist organization involves 
agreeing with an organization’s objective to murder, and performing acts to 
advance that objective, the law states—and the Second Circuit has 
confirmed—that the individual has conspired to commit murder.300  This 
was the case for Wadih El-Hage, whose conviction for joining al Qaeda’s 
conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals abroad was affirmed by the Second 
Circuit.301  That ruling defined the crime’s evidentiary requirements and 
became an essential guide for distinguishing between participation in a 
terrorist murder conspiracy (carrying a potential life sentence) and 
provision of material support to a terrorist organization (which typically 
carries a sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment).302 
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The court’s approval of the charge against El-Hage paved the way for 
subsequent prosecutions of overseas murder conspiracy charges against al 
Qaeda members who, like El-Hage, did not themselves carry out any act of 
violence but actively embraced the organization’s murderous agenda.  A 
notable example is Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, who was convicted of murder 
conspiracy for, among other things, joining Bin Laden (his father-in-law) in 
an al Qaeda promotional video days after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks.303  Khaled al-Fawwaz, whose many al Qaeda activities included 
helping disseminate Bin Laden’s fatwa calling for the murder of American 
civilians, also was convicted of the murder conspiracy;304 as was 
Mohammed Jabarah, a Kuwaiti al Qaeda member who conducted terrorist 
planning in Southeast Asia.305 
The Second Circuit also established limits on the use of the conspiracy 
charge.  There would be no talismanic significance, for instance, to the 
mere invocation of Bin Laden or the al Qaeda name.  Seeing little more 
than that in the evidence against Yemeni imam Mohammed Al-Moayad, the 
Second Circuit reversed his convictions and seventy-five year sentence for 
providing material support to al Qaeda and Hamas.306  As explained in the 
court’s lengthy analysis, authored by Judge Barrington Parker, the key 
proof against Al-Moayad consisted largely of testimony from a credibility-
challenged informant and of associational links to Bin Laden and Hamas.307  
Those weak connections failed to justify the admission of other highly 
prejudicial evidence, including testimony about al Qaeda training camps, 
photos of Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, and testimony from a 
victim of a Hamas bus bombing in Tel Aviv whose cousin was killed in the 
attack.308  Admitting such inflammatory evidence under these 
circumstances was, in the court’s analysis, an error serious enough to have 
deprived Al-Moayad of a fair trial.309 
 
was a member of al Qaeda’s team in Nairobi at a time when al Qaeda members were 
traveling to Nairobi to conduct surveillance of the U.S. embassy, training in al Qaeda-run 
military camps, and planning the attack on the embassy; (5) served as the head of the Nairobi 
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Laden and Mohamed Atef, al Qaeda’s military commander, and returned to Nairobi with a 
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3.  Guidance for Overseas Evidence Collection 
Two of Judge Cabranes’s three opinions in the East Africa embassy 
bombings appeals added important texture to standards governing the 
complex landscape of overseas evidence collection.  The first dealt with the 
searches of El-Hage’s telephones and residence.310  The second resolved a 
host of issues relating to the overseas interrogations of Al-’Owhali and 
Odeh, which—particularly in the case of Al-’Owhali—yielded devastating 
admissions about the attack on the embassy in Nairobi.311 
The heart of the appellants’ claims was the assertion that U.S. 
interrogators did not effectively advise the appellants of their right to 
counsel, as required by the seminal Supreme Court case Miranda v. 
Arizona.312  The Second Circuit ultimately rejected those claims, finding 
that the advice was proper, but in reaching that conclusion, the court offered 
three vital points of guidance.  First, the court examined precedents from 
other circuits to make clear that Miranda applied overseas irrespective of 
the subject’s nationality or who controlled his custody.313  Thus, U.S. 
officials were required to provide the Miranda warning, even if the subject 
was in a foreign government’s custody, if the subject’s statement was to be 
used as evidence against him at a subsequent trial in the United States.314 
Second, the court made clear that this rule “in no way” impairs the U.S. 
government’s ability to gather foreign intelligence.315  By this, the court 
meant to emphasize that U.S. officials are free to interrogate a subject 
without advising him of his rights, if they believe that the subject possesses 
important threat information.  While proceeding in that manner risks 
exclusion of the subject’s statements from trial (unless they relate to a bona 
fide matter of “public safety”), the court’s clarification of the law provided 
flexibility for the government to assess that risk against the value of the 
expected threat information, free of any lingering concern that an 
interrogation without Miranda would per se violate the Constitution 
(regardless of any subsequent use in a court proceeding of statements made 
under such interrogation).316  This guidance became influential among U.S. 
policymakers involved in subsequent decisions of this sort and thereby had 
a significant (although, rarely publicly stated) impact on the handling of 
future overseas interrogations of terrorism subjects. 
Third, the court underscored the significance of context in foreign 
interrogations.  Synthesizing precedents from other circuits, the court noted 
that in the overseas setting, Miranda had been “applied in a flexible fashion 
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to accommodate the exigencies of local conditions.”317  In this regard, the 
court envisioned circumstances in which advice of counsel might not be 
required—for example, where U.S. officials were operating in good faith, 
but the provision of counsel was impermissible under local law or custom.  
While stopping short of carving out an overseas exception to Miranda, the 
court’s point—that officials need added flexibility abroad—has been 
instructive for U.S. authorities conducting foreign interrogations and will 
undoubtedly evolve further as other courts are presented with similar 
situations. 
4.  Reconciling National Security Interests 
and Rights of the Accused 
International terrorism cases, like espionage cases, occupy a landscape 
traditionally presided over by the agencies charged with protecting the 
nation from foreign threats.  The overlap engenders a layer of complexity 
rarely seen in standard criminal cases, due to the inherent tension between 
the covert mission of national security agencies, such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the hallmark openness of the criminal 
justice system.  The competing interests come to a head when, for example, 
the government wishes to use at a public trial information gathered in secret 
by one of the national security agencies.  These interests can collide even 
more sharply when secret information must be disclosed to the defense 
under standard rules of discovery.  Drawing on its experience with 
espionage cases, the Second Circuit has been a leader in resolving such 
dilemmas with care and ingenuity.  Indeed, it consistently has preserved the 
central interests of all interested parties, including the national security 
community, and provided clear guidance to inform future conduct. 
For instance, since the 1970s, the Second Circuit has steadfastly 
protected national security interests by endorsing a practice known as “in 
camera, ex parte” review of sensitive or classified materials that are relevant 
to a trial.318  The practice allows trial judges to assess such sensitive 
materials in private, without the defense’s input, usually to determine 
whether evidence collected through a covert program should be admitted at 
trial.  While this may at first glance appear unfair to the defense, which will 
find it difficult to mount an argument to exclude the evidence without 
access to the justification for its collection, the Second Circuit has also 
restricted in camera, ex parte review to questions that are, for example, 
“limited in nature” or capable of fair resolution without the benefit of the 
adversarial process.319  This approach makes good sense because it 
accommodates the government’s need for secrecy but only in circumstances 
that are unlikely to deprive the defense of its right to a fair trial. 
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Similarly, the Second Circuit has clarified the law governing the use of 
classified evidence in public trials, known as the Classified Information 
Procedures Act of 1980320 (CIPA).  Generally, the statute obligates the 
defense to identify classified information that it wishes to use and 
authorizes the trial court to determine, in a nonpublic hearing, whether such 
evidence should be admitted at trial.  The first terrorism prosecution to 
involve substantial use of CIPA was the case of the East Africa embassy 
bombing suspects, El-Hage in particular, and it presented a classic issue that 
would recur in terrorism cases for years to come.321  El-Hage was entitled 
under the federal discovery rules to obtain information about how his case 
had been investigated, but the material was classified and El-Hage, an 
accused member of al Qaeda, would never be given the requisite security 
clearance for access.  In a ruling that set the standard for resolving such a 
dilemma, the court endorsed a novel approach that required El-Hage’s 
counsel to obtain the necessary security clearance and then, on El-Hage’s 
behalf but without El-Hage’s actual participation, review the classified 
information and litigate through the standard CIPA process what portions of 
it could be used at trial.322 
In reaching this solution, the court carefully examined the entire process, 
including the classified information at issue, and found that El-Hage’s 
personal exclusion from the evidentiary review and argument did not 
violate his trial rights.323  At bottom, as the court explained, the subject 
matter of the material “bore no relationship at all to the question of [El-
Hage’s] guilt or innocence,”324 and El-Hage himself “could have done 
nothing” to advance his own interests had he been personally involved in 
the process.325  Numerous courts have since relied on the Second Circuit’s 
approach.326 
5.  Responding to Post-9/11 Executive Branch 
Counterterrorism Policies 
Aggressive executive branch policies adopted in response to al Qaeda’s 
September 11, 2001 attacks have raised moral questions for the nation and 
challenging legal issues for the courts.  Again, the Second Circuit has been 
at the forefront of the process.  Its reconciliation of these policies with 
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constitutional principles stands out in five critical respects:  (1) the 
government’s use of material witness warrants, (2) the scope of the 
government’s authority to detain “enemy combatants,” (3) the constitutional 
requirements for using information gathered under standards applicable for 
intelligence collection as evidence in criminal trials, (4) the legality of the 
government’s bulk collection of Americans’ telephone records under the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,327 and (5) the viability of a criminal 
prosecution of a detainee who alleges that he was tortured by the United 
States. 
The court was confronted with the government’s widespread use of the 
material witness statute in the wake of the September 11 attacks to arrest 
and detain individuals who had information of import to a New York City 
grand jury investigating the attacks.  The statute permits the detention of 
such witnesses, even though they are not accused of committing any crime, 
if they pose a risk of flight.328  The Second Circuit examined the legal 
implications of the policy in the appeal of Osama Awadallah, who was 
detained for two weeks under the statute after his telephone number was 
found on paperwork left behind by Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, 
two of the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77.329  In a cogent opinion 
by Judge Dennis Jacobs, in which Judge Chester Straub concurred, the 
court endorsed the government’s use of the statute.330 
Also in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and in a resounding 
rejection of executive policymaking, the Second Circuit held that the 
President lacks the authority to detain an American citizen on American soil 
as a so-called “enemy combatant.”331  The stakes could not have been 
higher because the case involved an individual, Jose Padilla, who the 
government claimed was trained overseas by al Qaeda and sent back to the 
United States to carry out a “dirty bomb” attack.332  Based on this 
information, Padilla was detained upon arrival at Chicago’s O’Hare 
International Airport.333  He was initially held on a material witness 
warrant, but, when the government was unable to mount a criminal case 
against him, the President ordered him detained by the military under the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force of 2001334 (AUMF), a law 
enacted shortly after the September 11 attacks.  The court ordered the 
government to release Padilla from military custody,335 finding that the 
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detention contravened another law, the Non-Detention Act of 1971,336 
which bars the President from detaining U.S. citizens absent specific 
congressional authorization.  Although the Supreme Court subsequently 
reversed that decision on a procedural ground,337 and Padilla remained in 
military custody, the lasting impact of the Second Circuit’s decision can be 
seen in the government’s subsequent decision to try Padilla on criminal 
charges in Florida,338 where he was convicted of providing material support 
to al Qaeda.339 
The Second Circuit was next called to address two key provisions of the 
controversial legislation known as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.  First, 
it was asked to interpret the provision that changed the threshold 
requirement for use in a criminal case of evidence obtained from wiretaps 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978340 (FISA).  The old 
statute was interpreted to permit use of FISA wiretap information in 
criminal trials so long as the “primary purpose” of the wiretap was to 
collect foreign threat information, not to obtain evidence for use in a 
domestic prosecution.  In 1984, the Second Circuit was one of the first 
courts to endorse the primary purpose requirement as a means of protecting 
trial defendants from constitutionally unreasonable searches and seizures—
mainly because it ensured that collection was aimed at foreign threat 
information, not a desire to gather trial evidence in circumvention of the 
more onerous standards governing traditional wiretaps.341  The USA 
PATRIOT Act lowered this threshold requirement from a “primary” to a 
“significant” purpose, and a U.S. citizen and former member of the Navy 
named Hassan Abu-Jihaad (né Paul Raphael Hall) was convicted under the 
Act of leaking to insurgent forces classified information regarding battle 
deployments of U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf.342  On appeal, Abu-Jihaad 
claimed that the new, lower standard rendered FISA unconstitutional.343  In 
a detailed opinion authored by Judge Reena Raggi, the court rejected that 
challenge, recognizing the government’s need to collect information for 
multiple purposes and concluding that the “significant purpose” 
requirement was “sufficient to ensure that the executive may only use FISA 
to obtain a warrant when it is in good faith pursuing foreign intelligence 
gathering.”344 
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Next, the court recently held that section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
did not authorize the National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk collection of 
Americans’ telephone records.  In ACLU v. Clapper,345 Judge Gerard 
Lynch, writing for a unanimous panel, found that the program’s collection 
of nearly every American’s telephone records was too broad to satisfy 
section 215’s authorization for the collection of information “relevant” to an 
“authorized investigation.”346  Such widespread collection under the 
program failed to meet this requirement, in the court’s assessment, because 
it was not tailored to a particular investigation, but instead sought historical 
information that could be mined in future, unspecified counterterrorism 
probes.347  “[S]uch an expansive concept of ‘relevance,’” the court held, “is 
unprecedented and unwarranted.”348  While the court did not order a halt to 
the program—perhaps because the legislation was already set to expire in a 
matter of months—its decision undoubtedly impacted Congress’s 
deliberation about whether and how to reformulate section 215.  At the time 
of the decision, Congress was considering three legislative options:  (1) to 
reauthorize the provision without change (which would have permitted the 
NSA program to continue absent a court injunction); (2) to allow the 
provision to sunset (which would have left the program unauthorized); or 
(3) to enact a new law, the USA Freedom Act (which would end the 
program and create a more focused call-records program in its place).  
Following the court’s decision, Congress enacted the new, more limited 
law, which confined the program’s scope along lines resembling what the 
Second Circuit envisioned.349 
Finally, the Second Circuit made clear that some of the extraordinary 
methods of intelligence gathering used by the executive branch in the wake 
of the September 11 attacks, including the use of what many describe as 
torture, would not, without more, serve as a bar to criminal prosecution 
simply because of the nature of the acts or because of the delay that such 
acts caused.  The test case was that of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a 
Tanzanian al Qaeda member who was among the operatives who planned 
the East African embassy bombings.350  He fled to Pakistan just before 
those 1998 attacks, but was captured in Afghanistan in 2004 and held for 
two years in secret CIA custody, where he was subjected to so-called 
“enhanced interrogation techniques,” before being transferred to the U.S. 
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to face a military commission.351  In 
2009, before Ghailani was tried by the military, the Obama administration 
sent him to New York City, where he was tried and convicted of conspiring 
to attack the embassy in Tanzania and sentenced to life in prison.352  On 
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appeal, Judge Cabranes, writing for the court, found that the government 
had a legitimate basis for placing Ghailani in the CIA interrogation 
program—namely, a “reasonable belief that he had valuable information 
essential to combating [a]l Qaeda and protecting national security.”353  For 
that reason, the court found no basis under the Constitution to bar the 
prosecution of Ghailani in federal court.354 
Despite the Second Circuit’s ruling and the Obama administration’s 
once-stated plan to try many Guantanamo detainees in the federal courts, as 
of now Ghailani remains the only detainee to have received such a trial.  
Facing fierce political opposition, the administration scuttled plans to send 
the Guantanamo detainees responsible for the September 11 attacks, 
including the plot’s mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to New York 
City for a trial in federal court.  Since that time, however, as military 
commissions of those detainees and others have languished, federal 
terrorism cases in New York have repeatedly proceeded efficiently to 
verdict, leaving little doubt that the federal system is a venue of the utmost 
reliability for these extraordinarily complex cases.  At the core of that 
system is the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence in the terrorism arena, which 
has provided a time-tested legal foundation.  In other words, the Second 
Circuit’s consistent ability to both recognize the government’s legitimate 
interests in preserving the security of the nation, and at the same time 
adhere to civil liberties and the rule of law, has not only demonstrated in the 
most profound terms the court’s commitment to justice, but it also has 
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solidified the court’s leadership in the field of national security 
jurisprudence for years to come. 
CONCLUSION 
For nearly a century, the Second Circuit has confronted cases involving 
the greatest risks to the nation’s security, from the menace of Communism 
in the 1950s, to the modern threat of international terrorism.  These cases 
have been uniquely complicated in their high-stakes subject matter:  
politics, foreign policy, and national security itself.  Yet the court has 
consistently cut through the external noise to bear down on the necessary 
questions of law and fact and has consistently delivered resolutions that are 
models of justice.  At every intersection of individual liberty and national 
security, the Second Circuit has found the fair and proper balancing points.  
It thus has fulfilled its mission in the highest traditions of American justice, 
and the court serves as a shining example for other legal systems in the age 
of espionage and terror. 
